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ABSTRACT 
Generals, entrepreneurs and planners aim to dislocate enemies, outsmart competitors or build iconic cities. 
All advocate ‘smart strategy’ but what are its constituents? I seek some cross-disciplinary clarification. A 
selection of military, business and planning literature is investigated, looking for common themes and a 
smart strategy framework. Strategic complexity and the limits to generalisation in turbulent times are 
noted. In the military, overwhelming force confronts asymmetric warfare with deception and carefully-
calibrated power projections, conducted at tempo, to confuse and overwhelm the enemy. In business, 
making  money  is  necessary  but  insufficient  for  a  smart  strategy.  Other  ‘smart’  criteria  are  ethics, 
delegation, talented people and continuous systems innovation. In urban planning, centralist or dispersed 
intervention  strategies  jostle  with  evolutionary  ones  but  without  a  final  resolution  in  complex, 
idiosyncratic cities with adjustment lags and spatial irresolution. Despite context dependency, our multi-
disciplinary overview generates some practical business advice. A smart strategy recoils from top-down, 
techno-centric or managerialist litanies. Clarity of purpose, sound intelligence and judgment orientate the 
entity and harmonize its activities around key products/markets. Deception confuses and disorientates 
competitors  but  needs  product  support.  Flexibility/adaptability  balances  informed  leadership  with 
devolved innovation, underpinned by systems upgrades and talent. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Simplistic  notions  of  ‘smart  strategy’  are  wrong 
because  organizations  have  competing  objectives, 
confront  complex  turbulent  environments  with 
information  asymmetry  (Whittington,  2001;  Osinga, 
2007;  George,  2011).  The  word  ‘smart’  is  widely 
applied.  Generals  use  ‘smart  bombs’,  academics  and 
government  advocate  for  various  ‘smart  responses  to 
global warming’ (Lomborg, 2010; Rayner, 2007). Other 
smart  applications  extend  to  power  grids  (Joskow, 
2012),  computing  (Alamouti,  1998),  genetics     
(Schultz et al., 1998) and cities (Caragliu et al., 2009). 
Smart  rhetoric,  though,  can  mask  corporate  fraud  or 
stupidity  (Shiller,  2005;  Alvesson,  2010).  The  paper 
looks for a common conceptual thread to link together 
military, business and planning discourse. The goal is a 
general  framework  for  smart  strategy  and  some 
practical business recommendations. 
1.1. Smart Military Strategy 
Warfare  is  a  destructive  rather  than  constructive 
activity  (Bungay,  2011)  but  military  discourse  could, 
nevertheless,  yield  some  insights  for  smart  strategy, 
particularly in regards to business competition although 
scrutiny of military practice is, perhaps, less useful for 
planners.  Tzu  (2000)  is  a  seminal  military  text.  It 
certainly  dispels  static  strategic  notions  and  notes  that 
tactics  without  strategy  is  ‘the  noise  before  defeat’. 
Famously, Sun Tzu also states: ‘all warfare is based on 
deception’  (ibid:  1.18),  a  point  often  neglected  in 
conventional business texts. For Sun Tzu, the ingredients 
for  victory  are  competent  commanders,  an  ideological 
consensus  or  ‘Moral  Law’  and  robust  intelligence  and 
logistic systems or ‘Method’ to inform position (‘Earth’), 
determine timing (‘Heaven’) and execute audaciously. 
In  European  antiquity,  Marathon  was  a  key  battle. 
Greeks won the day by a bold sortie from Athens which Simon Huston / American Journal of Economics and Business Administration 4 (3): 190-196, 2012 
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allowed them to surprise one part of the divided Persian 
army (Billows, 2010). In the Roman era, Scipio Africanus 
seized  the  initiative  both  when  he  marched  on  New 
Carthage and when he invaded Africa. Scipio had a firm 
grasp of the broad situation, formulated bold plans which 
he executed flexibly. His preparations were thorough and 
extended to strengthening the moral of his troops. He also 
modernized the Roman Army (Gabriel, 2008), although, 
contrary  to  popular  myth,  Scipio  did  not  instigate  the 
adoption of the infamous Spanish gladius (Hackett, 1989). 
In  late  antiquity,  continuous  reflection  on  strategy 
and military adaptation in the face of new threats, such 
as  Hunnic  composite  bow,  explain  Byzantine’s 
endurance (Luttwak, 2009). In Strategikon, for example, 
the  Emperor  Maurice  (circa  592  AD)  dissects 
engagements,  such  as  the  Battle  of  Dara  in  530  AD. 
Here,  General  Belisarius  used  intelligence,  surprise  and 
‘flexibility under unified effort and leadership’ to cement 
victory (Dornstadter, 2010). According to Hughes (2009), 
at  Dara  Belisarius  ‘engineered  events  so  that  the  main 
enemy  strike  would  occur  on  the  flanks’  which 
deliberately  recoiled  to  enable  a  lateral  counter-attack. 
Belisarius’s  used  topography,  defensive  trenches  and 
capitalized on Persian mistakes (Lillington-Martin, 2007). 
In the nineteenth century, Napoleon distilled military 
strategy into ‘a well-reasoned and extremely circumspect 
defensive,  followed  by  a  rapid  and  audacious  attack’. 
The commander’s unflappable judgment was critical but, 
Boyd  notes,  with  time,  Napoleonic  battles,  such  as  at 
Borodino  (1812),  became  more  static  and  destructive 
(Osinga, 2007). Clausewitz (2008) overtly advocated for 
attrition warfare. His wunderliche dreifaltigkeit or ‘holy 
trinity  of  war’  (ibid  19)  was  violence,  chance  and 
rational  calculation  aimed  at  destruction.  Given  the 
difficulty of filtering ‘false from true information’ (ibid: 
149) in the fog of war, the prosecution of an innovative 
attack  is  inevitably  risky.  Technological  and  logistical 
system superiority helps mitigate risk. Telegraph and rail 
dominance  gave  Union  troops  eventual  victory  in  the 
American  Civil  War  (Cohen,  1996).  Deception  or 
‘gaming’  is  an  alternate  way  to  moderate  risk.  The 
Soviets used Maskirovka to deliver force ‘preponderance 
at  the  decisive  point’  (ibid:  156)  and  unhinged  the 
Germans  both  at  Stalingrad  in  November  1942  and 
Kursk the following year.  
In  recent  times,  the  setbacks,  expense  and  public 
relations  disasters  entailed  in  asymmetric  conflicts  in 
Iraq  and  Afghanistan  catalyzed  re-thinking  of  US 
military  strategy.  Nowadays,  the  emphasis  is  more  on 
subversion, disorientation and disruption to  ‘get inside 
the  adversary’s  OODA  (Observation,  orientation, 
decision  and  action)  loops’,  overload  systems,  destroy 
harmony and shatter the ‘will to resist’ (Osinga, 2007: 
176). Flexible use of multiple tools, including soft power 
and unconventional war degrades an enemy’s capacity to 
act (Davis et al., 1996; Lloyd, 2011; Ojiako et al., 2010; 
Nye, 2004). The 2008 US Military  Field Manual  now 
extends  to  information  management  and  includes 
cyberspace as part of battlefield ‘situational awareness’.  
1.2. Smart Business Strategy 
In conventional business strategy, ‘observation’ and 
‘orientation’  are  merged  into  one  step:  ‘establishing 
position’ (Johnson and Scholes, 2008). The potency of 
traditional  management  and  financial  tools  to  inform 
strategy  diminishes  as  technological  and  other 
‘unstructured  randomness’  or  turbulence  increases 
(Ansoff,  1965;  Robbins,  1987;  Mintzberg,  1994). 
Traditional investment appraisal discounting techniques 
struggle  to  evaluate  project  viability  (Borison,  2005; 
Caldwell et al., 2006; Luehrman, 1998; Mitchell, 2009; 
Mun, 2006; Taleb, 2010). Despite these well-established 
limitations, populist and other business literature proffers 
a  bewildering  and,  in  the  end,  superficial  spectrum  of 
practical  strategic  ‘solutions’  across  a  swathe  of  areas 
(Melnyk et al., 2010). Whittington (2001) offers deeper 
insight into ‘smart strategy’ beyond superficial classical 
frameworks  or  fragmented  corporate  practices.  He 
proposes  four  strategic  approaches:  ‘classical’, 
‘evolutionary’,  ‘processualists’  and  ‘systemic’  with  a 
spectrum of outcomes and implementation mechanisms. 
Clearly, the pre-requisite for a smart business strategy is 
clarification of purpose, time horizon and risk appetite.  
However, in commerce, just as in war, victory alone 
is insufficient. A smart commercial strategy must both 
generate adequate returns  for risk and also  meet other 
deontological  and  teleological  criteria.  Cost-cutting  or 
gaming  is  insufficient.  Plagued  by  parochial  attitudes, 
petty politicking and agency problems, conservative or 
‘comprador’ firms can yet be profitable. ‘Dumb’ profits 
can  be  earnt  by  milking  ‘cash  cow’  products, 
compromising safety, exploiting subsidies, polluting or 
by  paying  bribes  and  kickbacks.  Product 
usefulness/quality is questionable in comprador entities. 
Staff  is  de-motivated  and  team  learning  is  ineffective 
(Geus, 1988). Such entities are cunning but not smart. A 
smart  business,  on  the  other  hand,  delivers  a  quality 
product  with  some  collective  benefits.  Like  a  general, 
concentrating  his  forces  behind  a  deceptive  veil  of 
skirmishers, a smart business delivers a productive blow Simon Huston / American Journal of Economics and Business Administration 4 (3): 190-196, 2012 
 
192  Science Publications  
AJEBA 
under  its  marketing  hype.  Clever  marketing  can  build 
initial  awareness,  but,  ultimately,  must  support  a 
socially-useful  product.  Lack  of  product  authenticity, 
dilutes  trust  and  increases  long-term  risk  (Beer  and 
Eisenstat,  1996;  Philp,  2012).  Strong  governance  and 
audit  capabilities  help  to  detect  transactions  which, 
although ostensibly lucrative, are unethical, have delayed 
or dispersed cost implications. Here, the dismal record of 
Tepco, BP and many banks during the Global Financial 
Crisis bear witness (GW, 2010). 
Ethical  leadership  underpins  smart  commercial 
strategy. Clear purpose, risk posture and ethics nurture 
an the entrepreneurial and productive culture required for 
an authentically smart strategy which balances foresight 
with subsidiarity (delegation). Proactive human resource 
management  builds  a  climate  of  innovative  delegation 
and Entrepreneurial Orientation (EO). Committed smart 
people  automatically  follow  leading  trends,  talk  to 
experts and early adopters (Hertz, 2011) and generate 
the  artful  scenarios  which  inform  firm  adaptation 
(Heijden, 2011). Apart from ethical and intelligent, a 
smart  entity  continuously  adapts.  It  re-configures  its 
architecture,  alliances  and  systems  to  upgrade 
intelligence  and  productive  capabilities.  Intelligence 
updates extend to customers, competitors and various 
risks  beyond  the  diminished  ‘flatland’  of  scanning 
around current operations (Bartlet and Ghoshal, 1993; 
McShane and Glinow, 2008).  
Even  some  collaborative  research  consortia  recoil 
from  deep  strategic  synthesis  or  strategic  foresight  to 
question ‘currently popular ideology’ (Slaughter, 1999). 
In  contrast,  Wilber  (1996)  internal/external  and 
individual/collective  quadrants  provide  an  Integral 
Futures  (IF)  conceptual  framework  to  scan  beyond  the 
compromised  implicit  acceptance  of  dominant  social 
structures  and  cultural  perspectives.  Unlike  incremental 
forecasting  and  scenario  analysis,  strategy  Informed  by 
(IF)  goes  ‘beyond  the  collapse  of  industrialism’ 
(Slaughter,  2004).  Causal  Layered  Analysis  (CLA)  is 
another IF tool to explore different epistemologies beneath 
the surface gloss of popular litany. It unwraps reality by 
exposing  underlying  assumptions,  neglected  systemic 
causes  and  cultural  baggage  implicit  in  uncritically 
accepted ‘worldviews’ or myths (Riedy, 2008).  
In short, the literature on business strategy reveals a 
contested  and  fragmented  landscape  with  a  gulf 
separating  comprador  or  conservative  from  and  smart 
entrepreneurial  firms.  Impoverished  by  an  entirely 
pragmatic mindset, the former group pursues short-term 
returns  and  lacks  foresight.  Instead,  comprador  or 
conservative firms sell tried and tested product or protect 
existing market share by gaming the current dysfunctional 
system.  Gaming  extends  to  a  spectrum  of  socially 
degenerative  activities  including  bribery,  counterfeiting, 
mimicking,  lobbying,  dissimulating,  deceiving  or 
monopoly practices. In contrast, smart EO firms prosecute 
nimble  and  authentic  commercial  pathways,  geared  on 
nurturing enduring trust in an evolving circular economy 
with  products  designed  for  recycling  and  distributed 
across mixed real and virtual channels. 
1.3. Smart Strategy in Urban Planning  
Strategy in urban planning is also contested. First, the 
legitimate sphere of government intervention is disputed. 
The  ideological  dispute  between  interventionists  and 
libertarians ruptures urban planning. For interventionists 
‘smart strategy’ sketches inspiring collective betterment 
visions, directs unhealthy private impulses and curtails 
opportunistic excesses. Libertarians, on the other hand, 
question  the  legitimacy,  opportunity  costs  and 
unintended  consequences  of  imposed  urban  objectives 
and  resist  any  restraint.  For  interventionists,  manifest 
‘market  failure’  impels  strategic  direction  toward 
‘community  good’  (Aristotle,  2006).  Harmony  is 
impossible unless private architectural, environmental or 
aesthetic  excesses  are  resolutely  curbed.  However, 
planners dispute the functional direction, form or even 
the  best  mechanism  to  achieve  lofty  urban  social 
objectives.  Some  seek  to  impose  monumental 
engineering or architectural solutions to enhance global 
competitiveness or attract investment. Others recoil from 
the  foisting  of  autocratic  or  bureaucratic  ‘corporate 
machine-architecture’  and,  instead,  favor 
democratization  and  devolved  planning  regimes  for 
community health (Alexander, 2010). 
Most planned settlements were built for religious or 
defensive purposes while the complex layered pattern of 
organic ones emerged in Europe over centuries from the 
conflicted  pursuit  of  hegemony,  contingent  geography 
and  evolving  trade  patterns  (Nicholas  et  al.,  2003). 
Roman urban planners either had religious, military or 
symbolic  agendas  to  reinforce  the  Emperor’s  power 
through spectacle or centralized monumentalism. In De 
Architectura  (circa  40  BC),  the  Roman  planner, 
Vitruvius,  dwells  on  shading  and  aeration  for 
amphitheatres to diffuse the smell of evisceration (Hall, 
2002)  while  Augustus  extended  the  architectural 
legitimization of his regime by revitalizing Rome’s vici 
or  neighborhoods  (Lott,  2004).  In  medieval  Europe, 
many cities consolidated a Roman nucleus but, disease, Simon Huston / American Journal of Economics and Business Administration 4 (3): 190-196, 2012 
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conflict  or  migration  mitigated  their  subsequent 
development.  In  the  Umayyad  capital  of  Cordoba,  for 
example,  prolonged  sieges  hemmed  Syrian  refugees 
within  its  walls  and  explain  its  current  dense  urban 
morphology (Hillenbrand, 1999).  
In the modern era, Haussmann’s Paris, Le Corbusier 
grandiose master plans or Lutyen’s colonial New Delhi, 
dismissed  by  Pevsner  and  Aitchison  (2010)  as  pastiche 
historicism, all illustrate strong centralist tendencies and 
symbolic  domination.  Ebenezer  Howard  offers  another 
collective but, this time, more decentralized alternative to 
the ‘sordid congestion’ of English towns. He proposed the 
democratic dispersal of the ‘Garden City’ (Howard, 2008). 
For  Howard,  rail  was  the  physical  key  to  intelligent 
dispersal  but  real  urban  progress  required  the  social 
betterment and a ‘greater regard for the well being of our 
fellows’ (Howard, 2008). Howard blamed urban failure on 
both a ‘want of foresight of those who little dreamed of 
the future development of the railways?’ and ‘a society 
largely based on selfishness and rapacity’ (ibid: 211).  
For Sir Patrick Geddes (1949) smart urban strategy has 
a  ‘neotechnic’  orientation  beyond  the  obsessive 
obfuscation  of  ‘money  economics’.  Rather  than  the 
‘private  dissipation  of  resources’  smart  neotechnic 
strategy is informed by a ‘vital synoptic vision’ for ‘public 
conservation’  and  to  connect  ‘the  past  with  detailed 
multifaceted assessment of current assets’ (ibid: 142). For 
Geddes, grandiose monumentalism treats the symptoms of 
urban  isolation  whereas  the  ‘conservative  surgery’  of 
piecemeal  rehabilitation  cures  it.  Fordlandia  in  Brazil 
provides a salutary, if exotic, illustration of the dangers of 
excessive autocratic monumentalism (Grandin, 2010). 
Financial  turmoil,  manifest  waste  and  injustice 
notwithstanding  (Shleifer,  2000),  libertarians 
dogmatically  resist  autocratic  centripetal  or  dispersed 
attempts to impose betterment. The default consequence, 
with a globalized economy, is that international capital 
flows and consequent job migration drive chaotic urban 
change. India presents a good example with sub-national 
and  local  planning  regimes  ineffective  in  moderating 
transformation  of  Bangalore,  Kolkata  and  Delhi  by 
information  technology  firms  (Chatterji,  2011).  In  the 
liberal  discourse,  the  Internet  and  social  media  have 
revolutionized  the  urban  planning  landscape  and 
governments, rather than attempting to modify the urban 
fabric, should instead let or even facilitate the operation 
of market forces (Ratti and Townsend, 2011).  
In  the  climate,  a  ‘politics  of  urgency’  though  has 
popularized  a  gamut  of  ‘strategic  solutions  across  a 
spectrum  of  technocratic  or  community  poles  with 
‘smart’ labels. New Sondago city, in Korea, or Masdar 
City,  in  the  United  Arab  Emirates,  are,  respectively, 
technocratic ‘knowledge’ or ostensibly ‘green’ imposed 
strategic  ones  but  perhaps  a  wiser  path  toward  real 
sustainable  creative  cities  is  more  people-orientated 
development (Goede, 2011; O’Connor and Healy, 2004; 
Rooney and McKenna, 2005; Throsby, 2006).  
2. CONCLUSION 
To  conclude  the  eclectic  foray  into  urban  planning 
looking for smart strategy again encountered a severely 
conflicted  landscape.  Strategic  urban  planning  pits 
utopians,  with  their  disparate  collective  urban  visions, 
against  libertarians  protesting  against  waste  or 
managerialism  (Wadley,  2008).  Libertarian  ‘cyborg’ 
cities  overtly  or  implicitly  support  existing  social 
structure, vested commercial interests without adequate 
responses  to  collective  challenges  (Gandy,  2005; 
Gleeson, 2010; Newman et al., 2009; Rybczynski, 2011). 
Unmanaged  populations,  climate  change,  peak  oil, 
pollution,  congestion  and  unprecedented  extinctions, 
seem  to  calls  for  collective  intervention.  But,  because 
urban  systems  are  idiosyncratic,  complex  and  strongly 
influenced  by  spatially  remote  policy  or  global 
turbulence  (Heywood,  1969),  no  definitive  planning 
blueprint is forthcoming. Nevertheless while smart urban 
detail  is  unresolved,  it  is  underpinned  by  informed 
judgment, rule of law and robust governance.  
2.1. Synthesis:  Proposed  Smart  Strategy 
Framework  
The, albeit eclectic, conspectus of strategy across the 
military,  business  and  planning  disciplines  encounters 
discord and no singular framework for ‘smart’ strategy. 
In  military  sphere,  litanies  of  ‘overwhelming  force’ 
contrast  with  a  panoply  of  forces,  shaping  and  re-
configuration  for  adaptability.  In  business,  much 
conventional strategy has a diminished problem-solving 
and practical stance, compromised by implicit acceptance 
of dominant ideology, social structures or cultures. To my 
mind,  a  ‘smart’  business  must  make  clean  money 
intelligently.  Others  may  disagree  but,  here,  I  exclude 
comprador  or  conservative  strategic  stances  without 
collective  merit,  innovation  or  ethical  constraints.  In 
planning,  libertarians  resist  collective  impositions, 
whether  autocratic  or  inspired  by  place-making  for 
community dwelling. However, the legacy of laissez-faire 
planning  regimes  is  often  dystopic.  Dysfunctional 
manifestations  include  slums,  insidious  sprawl, 
congestion, toxicity and the proliferation of ugliness.  Simon Huston / American Journal of Economics and Business Administration 4 (3): 190-196, 2012 
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In an uncertain and complex world, characterised 
by diverse objectives and different cultural, legal and 
administrative  backdrops,  survival  depends  on 
ingenuity and adaptation. Surprise military campaigns, 
innovative products or catalyst urban renewal projects 
are  executed  promptly  and  cost-effectively.  In  the 
event  of  setbacks,  smart  strategy  adapts  to  either 
resilient  pursuit  or  rapid  disengagement  and 
redeployment  of  assets.  Smart  strategy  provokes 
deeper  questioning  of  short-term  orientations  and 
dominant  cognitive  representations,  assumptions  and 
existing practices. Practical business advice from our 
multidisciplinary conspectus includes: 
 
·  Clarify entity purpose and risk appetite 
·  Tap into multiple intelligence sources  
·  Use foresight techniques to seize the initiative  
·  Build  team  harmony  and  by  authentic  and  ethical 
leadership 
·  Collaborate with trusted partners 
·  Diversify projects portfolio across a spectrum of risk  
·  Recognise  the  tension  between  compliance 
(governance) and adaptability (delegation) 
·  Gain feedback from suppliers and customer to for 
product quality/innovation 
·  Use deception to mislead competitors  
·  Encourage systems evolution for resilience 
·  Adopt continuous learning  
·  Recruit and nurture talent  
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